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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of the creation of a free trade area that will
encompass the entire hemisphere stretching from the
northernmost point in Canada to Tierra del Fuego has long been
discussed in the United States and Latin America with little
result. However, with the start of negotiations last month to
create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) there is hope
that the vision will become a reality. Despite this optimism there
are many obstacles that must be overcome before this goal will
become a reality.
In December 1994, at the Summit of the Americas, President
Clinton signed a declaration with thirty-three other leaders from
the hemisphere which established the parameters and objectives
of the negotiations for an ambitious project that not only includes
the FTAA initiative, but also negotiations addressing the
preservation of democracy in the hemisphere, the eradication
poverty and discrimination throughout the region, and the
promotion and improvement of education in the Americas.' The
hope is that through these four 'pillars' Latin America and the
Caribbean can break out of their long history of slow economic
growth and guarantee the necessary level of sustainable
development that will change the face of the region in the next
century.
With the creation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)2 in 1994 many saw a renewed opportunity
1. Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec. 11,
1994, 34 I.L.M. 808, 810-815 (1995).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993)[hereinafter NAFTA].
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for the long promised hemispheric free trade area based on that
agreement." The advocates of this 'hub and spoke' approach saw
Mexico as simply the first Latin American country to join the
agreement with other hemispheric states individually
negotiating to join NAFTA as they were determined to be able to
integrate themselves into the agreement economically.4 In fact,
when Chile began negotiations with the NAFTA partners in 1994
it was believed that it would be the first of many 'spokes' to be
attached to the NAFTA hub.' However, this approach did not
survive long as Chile suspended its negotiations in 1995 pending
approval of 'fast track' negotiating authority in the United
States.! The eventual result of United States inaction was the
signing of bilateral free trade agreements between Canada and
Chile, Mexico and Chile, and MERCOSUR7 and Chile.
Today, there is little doubt that all hope in achieving a
hemispheric free trade area rests not with countries joining
NAFTA, but with the FTAA negotiations which encompass all
the countries in the hemisphere, save Cuba, negotiating together
for the creation of a comprehensive agreement that overlays all of
the existing regional and subregional agreements. While this is
not to say that many of the provisions found in NAFTA will not
be included in the FTAA, it is almost a certainty that the United
States position is considerably weaker in this format than under
the 'hub and spoke' approach as it will face the growing economic
power of Brazil and MERCOSUR in achieving many of its trade
3. See David Gilmore, Note, Expanding NAFTA to Include all of the Western
Hemisphere: Making Chile the Next Member, 3 J. INVL L. & PRAC. 413(1994)(For further
discussion on Chilean ascension to NAFTA). See also Raymond J. Ahearn, supra note 11,
Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief, Trade in the Americas, supra note 43 at 2.
See also Mark, B. Baker, Integration of the Americas: A Latin Renaissance or a
Prescription for Disaster? 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 309, 324, n.142 (1997) and Dr.
Richard L. Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements and the Establishment of a Free Trade
Area of the Americas, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 945, 950, n.45 (1996)(Even before
President Bush proposed a hemispheric free trade agreement in his 1990 Enterprise for
the Americas, President Johnson forwarded a similar agreement at a 1967 conference of
regional leaders.)
4. See Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, Potential Conflict Areas in any Future Negotiations
Between MERCOSUR and the NAFTA to Create a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 14
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP L. 305 (1997).
5. See id.
6. See id. (The most recent legislation allowing for "fast track" approval of trade
legislation expired in 1994 and attempts to revive it have failed as of this writing.)
7. Treaty of Asuncion, March 26, 1991, Arg. Rep.- Fed. Rep. of Brazil- Rep. of Para.-
Eastern Rep. of Uru., 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991), Establishing a Southern Common Market -
Mercado Comun del Sur [hereinafter MERCOSUR].
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objectives. This is especially true since United States negotiators
are currently without the added negotiating power that comes
with fast track authority!
Since the creation of MERCOSUR and NAFTA there has
been much debate on both sides of the free trade issue as to
whether the removal of trade barriers is achieving increased
trade and development or whether it is simply diverting trade
and resources from one source to another. The recent opening of
formal negotiations on the FTAA has done little to cool that
debate, especially in the United States. It is within this context
that this paper will attempt to address whether the FTAA is
advisable and whether there is reason to hope that there will be
the type of changes that many in the United States and Latin
America hope will come about as a result of it by focusing on the
following issues: 1) the current structure of NAFTA and its
impact on trade between its partners; 2) the current structure of
MERCOSUR and the affect it has had on intramember trade;
and 3) the format of the FTAA negotiations, its goals, and the
projected impact that it will have on the hemisphere based on
hemispheric trade by NAFTA and MERCOSUR.
II. NAFTA
A. Overview
The North American Free Trade Agreement was signed by
the presidents of the United States, Mexico, and Canada on
December 17, 1992, and entered into force on January 1, 1994.9
These three founding members are still the only participants in
the agreement to date.'0  Chile was invited to enter into
negotiations with the parties in 1994, but there has been no
progress in the negotiations." It is the only country that has
opened discussions as of this writing. 2
8. See David A. Gantz, The United States and the Expansion of Western
Hemisphere Free Trade: Participant or Observer?, 14 ARIZ. J. INTL & COMP. L. 381, 382
(1997).
9. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 2.
10. Id.
11. See Raymond J. Ahearn, Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief, Trade in
the Americas, February 27, 1998, at 5-6.
12. See id.
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Unlike the MERCOSUR structure discussed below, NAFTA
is governed by a single comprehensive agreement with
implementation legislation."3  This document, with its 22
chapters and ten annexes, incorporates all the dispute settlement
procedures, institutional structures, objectives and
comprehensive rules that govern trade between all three
partners.' It is very broad in its scope that provides for the
removal of most intra-regional tariffs and nontariff barriers
within fifteen years."
B. Selected Governing Clauses'6
The stated objectives of the NAFTA are found in Article 102
and include the following: 1) elimination of both tariff and non-
tariff barriers between the parties; 2) simplification of the cross-
border movement of goods and services between the parties; 3)
promotion of fair competition; 4) increased investment
opportunities; and 5) provide adequate and effective protection
and enforcement of intellectual property rights. 7
Chapter 4 of NAFTA governs the rules of origin
requirements for duty free treatment. Article 401 requires that
to qualify for a zero tariff rate you must establish that the good is
one of the following: 1) a product which is wholly obtained or a
good which is produced with materials exclusively from within
the territories of the parties; 2) non-originating material which
as the result of production undergoes a tariff reclassification; or
3) a product which is produced from one or more non-originating
materials and does not undergo a tariff reclassification, but
contains sufficient minimum regional content, based on either
the transaction value method of calculation or the net cost
13. See Gantz, supra note 8, at 382 (Some provisions vary as to the treatment of the
parties because of the incorporation of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement into
NAFTA, however, except where it is otherwise noted in NAFTA, this is limited to the




16. This section is merely an overview of some of the sections that this author
believes to be important to the discussion of this paper. For a more detailed discussion of
the NAFTA see O'Keefe, supra note 4, and JAMES R. HOLBEIN and DONALD J.
MUSCH eds., NAFTA, The Practitioner's Deskbook Series, 1994.




method of calculation. 8 The exceptions to these rules are very
limited and only apply to goods related to a product which has
been deemed to be an originating good." Exceptions to the
requirements would include things such as diagnostic equipment,
spare parts or tools customarily included with the good, and
retail packaging."0
Safeguard measures are controlled by Chapter 8. Under
Article 801, a member state may suspend a NAFTA tariff
preference or increase the tariff to the MFN rate, after serving
written notice to the state, if imports of the product "constitute a
substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to a
domestic industry producing a like or directly competitive good.""
The action must be taken within one year of the increase in
quantity of the imported product and cannot exceed three years
except in exceptional circumstances." Finally, after the ten year
transitional period such an action may only be taken with the
consent of the member exporting the good."
Foreign investment from another member of NAFTA is
governed by Chapter 11(A). Article 1102 provides that each
member shall afford investors from another member state
national treatment. Furthermore, a member may not require a
minimum level of equity to invest or that an investment must be
liquidated based on nationality of the investor. Under Article
1109, an investor may not be prevented from repatriating capital
from an investment by a member state. An investor is also
protected from discriminatory expropriations and entitled to fair
market value of the investment if there is any type of
governmental taking under Article 1110.
Under Chapter 11(B) an individual investor may submit a
claim for arbitration against a state if it is within three years of
the date of the loss. If there already has been an attempt to
resolve the dispute through consultation or negotiation, whether
18. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 2, art. 401(a)(b)(c)(d)(Under
Article 401(d), a product is required to have at least 60 percent region content under the
transactional value method requirement or at least 50 percent regional content if the net
cost method requirement is used. Article 402 establishes the formulae for the
determining regional content for both methods.)
19. Id. at art. 401(d).
20. Id. at art. 407, 408, & 409.
21. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 2, art. 801(1)-(2).
22. Id. at art. 801(2)(b)-(c)(i).
23. Id. at art. 801(2)(c)(ii) and art. 805.
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a claim is submitted to arbitration is entirely at the discretion of
the investor under Article 1121, as each member consents to
arbitration under Article 1122(1). For any arbitral proceedings
Article 1120 provides the investor with a choice of three different
sets of governing procedures. Finally, any award is binding upon
the parties under Article 1136(2) and if a member state should
fail to abide by award, action may be taken against it by the
member state of the investor under Article 1136(5).
Chapter 12 addresses trade in services. Article 1201
includes within its scope, all measures relating to cross-border
services from one member country to another except measures
relating to financial services, air transport, and government
procurement.24 Article 1202 requires that any service measures
afford national treatment to any service providers from another
member of NAFTA. Under Article 1210 all members were
required to eliminate all residency or citizenship requirements
for the licensing of professional services by January 1, 1996, and
any additional requirements for certification or licensing must be
transparent, as least burdensome as possible, and not a disguised
barrier to service.
The rules governing competition are located in Chapter 15.
Under Article 1501 each member state is obligated to adopt and
maintain measures which promote a competitive environment for
business. Articles 1502 and 1503 allow for the creation of
monopolies and state enterprises so long as they act in
accordance with the requirements of Chapter 15 and do not
engage in any discriminatory or anticompetitive behavior.
Chapter 17 controls the rules for all forms of intellectual
property protection. The protections provided by this chapter are
very comprehensive, ranging from traditional areas of protection
such as copyright, 5 patent,28 and trademark,27 to modern
technologies such as protection of encrypted satellite signals"
and semiconductor circuit designs.29 Article 1701(1) requires that
each member country afford nationals of another party "adequate
24. Financial services and government procurement are governed by Chapters 14
and 10, respectively.
25. North American Free Trade Agreement, Supra note 2, at art. 1705.
26. Id. at art. 1709.
27. Id. at art. 1708.
28. Id. at art. 1707.
29. Id. at art. 1710.
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and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights, while ensuring that measures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade." In addition to the requirements of Article 1701(1), Article
1701(2) states the members should accede to and establish as the
minimum protections, with the requirements of Chapter 17, the
following treaties:
1) 1971 Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of
Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of their
Phonograms;
2) 1971 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works;
3) 1967 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property; and
4) 1978 International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants or the 1991 International Convention for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants."
Chapter 19 governs the review and dispute settlement in
anti-dumping and countervailing duty matters. Under Article
1902 each member is allowed to apply its own national laws for
assessing anti-dumping and countervailing duties against the
imports of another member country. Interestingly, despite
preserving this authority for member states, Article 1904
replaces judicial review of anti-dumping and countervailing duty
determination with a binational panel whose decisions cannot be
reviewed by a court of the importing party. Said panel must be
requested by a member and the member is obligated to make
such a request at the behest of a person who would otherwise be
able to challenge the duty through a court action." Although
states may apply their own national laws, if they intend to
amend their legislation they must notify other affected members
in writing under Article 1903. Furthermore, under that same
provision a state may request that such amendment be reviewed
by a binational panel to ensure that it is in conformance with
Article 1902(2)(d)(i) or (ii).
Chapter 20(A) controls the institutional framework and
establishes two organs as the heart of the structure for NAFTA.
30. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 1701(2).
31. Id. at art. 1904.
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Article 2001 creates the Free Trade Commission (FTC) and
Article 2002 addresses the Secretariat. The FTC is responsible
for supervising the implementation" and further development of
the agreement.3 It is also tasked to resolve any interpretive
disputes regarding interpretation or application of the
agreement 4 and consider any matter affecting the operation of
the agreement.35 If it is unable to resolve any matter affecting the
agreement to the satisfaction of a member it may establish an
arbitral panel to decide the matter under Article 2008. The
Secretariat is subservient to the FTC and is actually three
different offices, one created by each member state.36  The
function of the Secretariat is to assist the FTC, support the work
of any committees created by the NAFTA, and assist any panels
created for review of anti-dumping and countervailing duty
matters."
Chapter 20(B) establishes the institutional dispute
settlement mechanism for NAFTA. Pursuant to Article 2004
these rules are applied to any request for arbitration relating to a
NAFTA dispute unless the area of dispute has its own special
provisions.8 Article 2005 gives a member the option using the
WTO or the NAFTA dispute settlement procedures. Articles
2006 and 2007 require that the members engage in consultation
and ask the FTC for assistance in resolving a dispute before an
arbitral panel can be convened under Article 2008. Under Article
2018(1), the member states must agree on a final resolution of
the dispute after receiving the panel's final report. Article
2018(2) requires that wherever possible the dispute resolution
should involve removal of the offending measure and only if that
is not possible is compensation acceptable. If the members are
unable to come to an agreement for resolution of the dispute,
Article 2019 allows the aggrieved member to suspend benefits of
equivalent effect to the member complained against.
While this section of the comment is only a limited
discussion of the whole North American Free Trade Agreement,
32. Id. at art. 2001(2)(a).
33. Id. at art. 2001(2)(b).
34. Id. at art. 2001(2)(c).
35. Id. at art. 2001(2)(e).
36. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 2002(1)-(2).
37. Id. at art. 2002(3).
38. E.g.., both anti-dumping/countervailing duty and foreign investment dispute
matters have their own procedures so they are specifically excluded.
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it is illustrative of the very detailed and comprehensive approach
that negotiations took in an effort to ensure protection of the
parties through a single agreement, covering a broad range of
areas beyond tariff elimination, including: nontariff barriers,
security commitments, and investment liberalization. 3' This
theme is also illustrated by the authority of the FTC and
inclusion of non-binding arbitration as a dispute resolution
mechanism." As an example, while NAFTA is a fully integrated
treaty, which contains its governing structure in Part Seven of
the Treaty, the institutional structure of MERCOSUR is found in
the Protocol of Ouro Preto (an agreement adopted by
MERCOSUR countries three years after the Treaty of Asuncion
which establishes the framework of MERCOSUR.)4' However,
despite being so comprehensive in most areas, NAFTA does not
attempt to encompass some of the goals set by MERCOSUR, such
as coordination of economic and monetary policies, establishment
of a common external tariff, or address free intra-NAFTA
movement of labor.42
C. Impact of the Agreement on Member Trade
The creation of NAFTA established North America as the
world's largest free trade bloc, for a brief period of time, until the
most recent expansion of the European Union. In 1997, it had
more than 395 million people and a gross domestic product of
$7.5 trillion.43  In 1997, intra-NAFTA trade accounted for 49
percent of all trade by its members," an increase of almost 11
percent a year on average since 1990.4" At the same time,
NAFTA trade to third countries was only growing at 7 percent.46
39. E.g., Not included in the discussion were the chapters governing government
procurement, telecommunications, standards related measures, and agricultural
measures to name but a few.
40. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 2006 & 2007.
41. Protocol of Ouro Preto, December 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1244. (Additional Protocol
to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of MERCOSUR.) See also, Gantz,
supra note 8, at 403.
42. E.g., Compare goals of Article I of Treaty of Asuncion and goals of Article 102 of
NAFTA. See also, Gantz, supra note 8, at 402.
43. See Integration and Trade in the Americas, A Preliminary Estimate of 1997
Trade, Periodic Note, Int.-Am. Dev. Bank, Dec. 1997, at 2.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 11. (Extra-NAFTA trade has increased an average of only 7 percent a
year during that period.) Id.
46. See Enrique V. Iglesias, The New Face of Regional Integration in Latin America
[Vol. 31:3
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1. Economic Effects
By almost all accounts NAFTA has been a windfall for
Mexico. Despite the serious economic downturn that it endured
in late 1994 and early 1995 during the peso crisis, Mexico has
seen substantial growth in its trade with its NAFTA partners
and a blossoming of foreign direct investment.
From 1994 to 1996 Mexico received $25 billion of foreign
direct investment in plants and equipment.4 ' This was the
second largest amount of direct investment of that type to a
developing country ever recorded.48 Seven billion dollars in
investment was projected for 1997, increased from only $4.3
billion in 1993, before NAFTA.49 As part of the impact from this
influx of capital, Mexico saw the employment in the maquila
industry increase by 20.3 percent in 1996 over the previous
year." The value added by parts and components from these
plants increased 63 percent between 1995 and 1996."'
In 1996, Mexican imports from the United States grew by 24
percent, exceeding the pre-peso-crisis levels of 1994." During
that same year, United States suppliers accounted for 75.5
percent of all Mexican imports, up from 69.3 percent in 1993.i
Between 1990 and 1996, Mexico increased its exports to the
United States by 142 percent, climbing from $30.3 billion to $73
billion. '4 Between 1990 and 1996, Mexico's imports from the
United States doubled from $28 billion to $57 billion.'
The effects of NAFTA trade on the United States has been
and the Caribbean, Presentation at the annual World Bank Conference on Development
in Latin America and the Caribbean, "Trade Towards Open Regionalism," Montevideo,
Uruguay, (June 29, 1997).
47. See Luis Fernando de la Calle, Mexico's View on the NAFTA, 14 ARIZ. J. INV'L &
Comp. L. 295, 296 (1997).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Gantz, supra note 8, at 391. Mexico's maquiladora program was a duty
drawback system that resulted in the establishment of over 2,000 factories, mainly along
the U.S.-Mexico border. It was required to be eliminated by NAFTA. Id.
51. See id. at 392.
52. See Integration and Trade in the Americas, supra note 43, at 11.
53. See WILLIAM J. CLINTON, STUDY ON THE OPERATION AND EFFECTS OF
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, iv. (Exec. Off. of the Pres. of
the U.S. 1997)[hereinafter President's Report].




decidedly more subdued, despite statistics showing that there
has been a significant increase in U.S. trade with Mexico. In
mid-1997, the United States International Trade Commission
(USITC) released a report that concluded while trade between
the United States and Mexico has increased significantly, there
was little impact on trade with Canada.' It also found that it
was unable to quantify a discernible effect by NAFTA on United
States GDP or investment." Despite the less than glowing report
by USITC, it is notable that since January 1, 1994, United States
total trade (imports and exports combined) with Canada and
Mexico has increased from an annual average of $269 billion in
1991 to 1993 to an annual average of $384 billion in 1994 to
1996.8 Bilateral trade between the U.S. and Mexico was $156
billion dollars in 1997, accounting for twenty percent of U.S. total
trade, up from $81 billion in 1993."9 Furthermore, while Canada
has been the largest trade partner to the U.S. even before
NAFTA, the agreement has increased trade with Mexico so
substantially that it passed Japan to become the second largest
export market for the United States in 1997.0 United States
exports to Mexico are increasing on average at 34 percent a year
and increased five percent more than exports to the rest of the
world in 1996.61 That same year, Mexico's share of United States
exports rose to 9.3 percent from 6.9 percent in 1993.2 In 1997,
the President's Study on the Operation and Effects of the NAFTA
estimated that the United States had increased exports to Mexico
by $12 billion, imports from Mexico by $5 billion.'
On the negative side, the United States total trade deficit
with Canada and Mexico ballooned from $8.6 billion to $34
56. See JayEtta Z. Hecker, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade
Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, United States General
Accounting Office; Testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and
Means, House of Representatives 6 (September 11, 1997) in Impact Report, See infra note
83.
57. See id. at 6.
58. See id. at 5.
59. See Congressional Research Service, U.S.-Mex. and U.S.-Can. Trade Statistics,
Nov. 1997. (Data is based on compilation of U.S. Dept of Commerce Official Statistics.
1997 statistics are annualized from Jan-Aug 1997 statistics.)
60. See Fernando de la Calle, supra note 47, at 297; See also Congressional Research
Service, supra note 59, compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Dept. of Commerce.
61. See Fernando de la Calle, supra note 47, at 297. U.S. exports to the world
increased 31 percent while exports to Mexico alone increased by 36 percent. Id.
62. See President's Report, supra note 53.
63. See id. at iii.
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billion." Importantly, bilateral trade between the United States
and Canada was over $208 billion in 1997, accounting for 41
percent of U.S. total trade, down slightly from just over $211
billion in 1993.5
It is obvious from the increases in Mexican trade they have
received a substantial benefit from NAFTA, it is difficult to
quantify what benefits NAFTA has bestowed on the United
States based on the statistics. While it is true that exports to
Mexico have increased substantially, since they are now the third
largest trading partner of the United States, they only account
for a small share of total U.S. exports.66 This is especially the
case when you consider the size of United States-Canada trade."
At the same time the amount of goods being imported has grown
quite substantially.8 While some of the figures may be distorted
by the Mexican peso crisis, in the end analysis, any evaluation of
the positive or negative impact of NAFTA on the United States at
this time is difficult to ascertain without a long-term evaluation
of the benefits of the agreement. This lack of available data is
especially troubling considering the potential trade distorting
effects of NAFTA discussed below and even broader impact that
the FTAA could have on the United States.
2. Trade Distortion
Many argue that although there are benefits to regional
trade arrangements, such as NAFTA, because they increase
intra-regional trade, they also tend to discriminate against
nonmembers potentially resulting in trade diversion. While it is
also generally held that this diversion is only present where
there are high tariffs governing nonmember trade, there is
evidence of diversion in the NAFTA context."° Most of the
concern about diversion centers around Central America and the
Caribbean because a significant portion of their trade is directed
64. See Hecker, supra note 56, at 5.
65. See Congressional Research Service, supra note 59.
66. See Ahearn, supra note 11, at 15.
67. See id. (In 1996, U.S. exports to Mexico accounted for only $57 billion, while
exports to Canada were almost $133 billion.) Id.
68. See id. at 12, Table 1.
69. See Dr. Richard L. Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements and the Establishment




at the United States and analysis has shown that their economic
growth has been negatively affected.7 In fact, the World Bank
has estimated that up to 36 percent of the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) country exports to the United
States could be displaced with countries such as St. Lucia facing
displacement of 79 percent.2 Most of these exports are being lost
from these countries as a result of suppliers shifting production
to Mexico because the requirements NAFTA rules of origin
necessitate such action so that the suppliers may take advantage
of the lower tariffs into the United States.73
As the United States is their most significant trading
partner, many Central American and Caribbean nations have
experienced significant economic downturns recently because of
their inability to compete with Mexico." The Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) that took effect on January 1,
1984, grants trade preferences to Central American and
Caribbean nations to a limited number of exports considered
vital to the region.75 "NAFTA Parity" legislation that would
grant Mexico-like trade treatment to CBERA nations has failed
to pass in Congress twice.7" An analysis that included 80 percent
of the U.S. imports from the region showed that between 1993
and 1996 there was a shift in the products away from CBERA
and toward Mexico.7 Apparel is the fastest growing category of
U.S. imports from CBERA countries. However, most products
are ineligible for CBERA tariff preferences, and they may only
get reduced tariffs if they are assembled with "fabric wholly
formed and cut in the United States.""s CBERA countries and
Mexico are similarly priced in labor operations and both offer
71. See Bernal, supra note 69.
72. See id. at 949-50.
73. See Gantz, supra note 8, at 392 n.5. See also Bernal, supra note 69, at 949 n.45.
74. See Gantz, supra note 8, at 409.
75. See Magda Kornis, Is NAFTA Affecting U.S. Imports from the Caribbean Basin?,
INT'L ECON. REV., SeptJOct. 1997, at 3, available at,
ftp://ftp.usitc.gov/pub/renorts/ier/PUB3065.PDF [hereinafter USITC report]. (The
preferences do not cover items such as apparel and petroleum-related products which
account for over half of U.S. imports from the region. Apparel alone was 40% of U.S.
imports from the region in 1996.) Id.
76. See id. at 3-4.
77. See id. at 4-5. Between 1993 and 1996 the CBERA share of U.S. imports of 35
leading commodities shrank 2.55 percent while Mexico's share increased 5.5 percent. Id.
at 5-6.
78. See id. at 7. From 1987 to 1996 apparel imports increased at 21 percent a year
on average. Id.
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lower transportation costs and close proximity to the U.S.
79
Despite this, CBERA countries have to compete with Mexico on
unequal terms. This is because of the 16.7 percent tariff that is
applied to the value added to the garments by assembling them
in CBERA nations, while none is applied to Mexican garments
and they enter duty free." Since the implementation of NAFTA,
CBERA countries share of the United States market has grown
at a very slow rate, while Mexico's share has more than
doubled.8 While most of Mexico's market share increase has
come at the expense of non-CBERA countries to this point, I find
it notable that until the implementation of NAFTA, CBERA
imports were increasing steadily and significantly. Now it
appears that their growth is stagnating.
Production shifts because NAFTA rules of origin are not
limited to CBERA countries. Some Asian suppliers also have
been forced to shift their production to Mexico. The Korean
television manufacturing industry has invested $500 million in
Mexico since 1991, shifting picture tube manufacturing and
television assembly jobs away from Asia because duty free status
is only available if the picture tube is of North American origin.8
While the investment in and of itself is not conclusive that there
is distortion, this is an example of the possible trade distorting
effects of NAFTA if it is shown that the televisions could be
produced cheaper in Asia and but for the rules of origin would
not be manufactured in Mexico.
Despite the focus above, the' impact of NAFTA in trade
distortion has not been limited to the United States. Because of
the 1994-95 peso crisis, Mexico increased its MFN bound tariff on
502 consumer goods to 35 percent from the previous level of 20
percent." As a result, U.S. goods meeting the rules of origin
requirements, as well as Mexico's other FTA partners, are now
79. See Kornis, supra note 75, at 7.
80. See id. (Mexican goods enter duty free if they are assembled using fabric wholly
formed and cut in the U.S.) Id. at 7-8.
81. See id. at 8. (Most of Mexico's increased import share has come at the expense of
non-CBERA countries which saw their share drop from 80.93% (1993) to 71.39% (1996).)
Id.
82 See Gantz, supra note 8, at 392.
83. See Kyle Johnson et al., Investigation No. 332-381: Impact of the North American
Free Trade Agreement on the US Economy and Industries: A Three-Year Review, Apr. 29,
1997, at 2-31, available at, http'J/www.usitc.gov/wais/reports/ar/w3045.htm. [hereinafter




enjoying a wider margin of preference over other foreign
suppliers to the Mexican market. '
III. MERCOSUR85
A. Overview
The common market of the southern cone or MERCOSUR,
the Spanish acronym it is more commonly known by, was created
with the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion on March 26, 1991, by
the presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay."
The treaty entered into force in November 1991."7 These four
founding members are still the only full participants to date.88
However, both Chile and Bolivia have signed agreements of
association with MERCOSUR.5
The MERCOSUR structure is governed by three agreements:
the Treaty of Asuncion,' the Protocol of Ouro Preto," and the
Protocol of Brasilia.92 Although the Treaty of Asuncion is the
founding document for the common market, it is a very simple
document and stands apart from NAFTA because of its skeletal
approach of mainly annunciating purposes, principles, and goals.
With only 24 articles and 5 annexes, it was deliberately drafted
to limit the amount of regulation that would take place during
the "transition" period and allow for easy adaptation as
circumstances presented themselves. 3
84. See id. at 2-31.




89. See Agreement of Economic Complementation between Chile and MERCOSUR,
June 25, 1996, Article 2. (Chile agreed to establish a free trade area with MERCOSUR in
June 1996. Under the agreement the tariffs on all goods, except for some sensitive goods
which will have a longer phase in, will be reduced to zero by 2006. Bolivia signed a
substantially similar agreement with MERCOSUR in December 1996.) See also
Integration and Trade in the Americas, supra note 43, at 16 n.22 (With the addition of
these two countries the free trade area of MERCOSUR includes half the population and
60 percent of the GDP of Latin America and the Caribbean.)
90. MERCOSUR, supra note 7.
91. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 41.
92. Protocol of Brasilia, Dec. 17, 1991, 36 I.L.M. 691, available at
http:/www.brasilemb.ord/economv/ProtBrasilia.htm.
93. See MARTIN AROCENA, COMMON MARKET OF THE SOUTHERN CONE:
MERCOSUR, 10 (1995) (This transition period was marked from the signing of the treaty,
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The Protocol of Ouro Preto, however, was negotiated to
expand and formalize the process by creating an institutional
structure to bind the parties. 4 The institutional structure, which
is discussed below, was only one of the accomplishments of the
protocol. In addition, it established MERCOSUR as a legal
person in international law for the purpose of negotiating with
third party countries, reaffinned the principles and objectives of
the Treaty of Asuncion, and confirmed the Decisions and
Resolutions that the MERCOSUR institutions dictated during
the transition period. 5 This was necessary because the organs
created under the Treaty of Asuncion to administer and
implement the agreement had no legal status and decisions
between the four member countries were made by consensus.
The final major agreement, the Protocol of Brasilia, was
created to govern dispute resolution and the interpretation of
MERCOSUR's rules during the transition period. The Protocol of
Ouro Preto preserves its validity and continues it under the
current institutional structure.96 Its role in MERCOSUR will be
discussed in the next section.
B. Selected Governing Clauses7
Article 1 of the Treaty of Asuncion, the founding treaty for
MERCOSUR, states that the objective of the agreement is to
create a common market by December 31, 1994."s It calls for the
free movement of goods, services, and factors of production
through the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff
restrictions on the movement of goods; the establishment of a
common external tariff; maintenance of a common trade policy;
the coordination of positions in international and economic
forums; and the coordination of macroeconomic policies regarding
March 1991, until the establishment of a common market by December 31, 1994).
94. See Dr. Paul Granillo Ocampo, Policy Commentary: Lawyering in the Americas:
Reflections on MERCOSUR and the Future of the Americas, 3 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 373,
380 (1996).
95. See Ana Maria De Aguinis, Can MERCOSUR Accede to NAFTA? A Legal
Perspective, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 597, 608 (1995).
96. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 41, ch. VI.
97. This section is merely an overview of some of the sections that this author
believes to be important to the discussion of this paper. For a more detailed discussion of
the governing agreements of MERCOSUR, See Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, supra note 4,
and the website of the Organization of American States at http://sice.oas.org.
98. MERCOSUR, supra note 7.
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foreign trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal and monetary matters,
foreign exchange, capital services, customs, transport, and
communications matters.
Annex Il governs the rules of origin requirements. These
rules, which are much more limited and simplified than the
NAFTA rules, are found in Article 1 of the Annex, as modified by
Decisions 6/94 and 23/94,"9 and fall into four general categories:
1) products raised, extracted or harvested in the territory of one
of the members of MERCOSUR such as mineral, plant, or animal
products; 2) products that are manufactured exclusively using
materials originating in territories of the members of
MERCOSUR; 3) products in which the manufacturer does not
use materials originating within MERCOSUR, but in which the
process transforms the product in such a manner as to result in a
tariff reclassification; or 4) the value of the MERCOSUR
materials used in assembly is not less than 60 percent of the
freight on board export value of the final product. °0 However,
there are exceptions to these rules. If a good is unavailable
within a reasonable time, is too expensive to obtain within the
region, or a regional product does not meet the necessary
technical specifications, a waiver may be obtained under Article 5
of the Annex."'
Annex IV governed the rules for safeguard measures, but it
is no longer effective as Article 1 limited the application of such
measures to the transitional period, up to December 31, 1994. It
limited the quotas to no less than the average physical volume of
the previous three years.0 . and could only be applied for a one-
year period with a renewal for an additional year.'
Interestingly, Article 3 of the annex specifically excluded the use
of technological advance or shift in consumer preference toward a
similar competitive product as determining factors in evaluating
the existence of or threat of serious damage to a product.
Intra-MERCOSUR foreign investment is governed by the
Protocol of Colonia.'1' Articles 2 and 3 of the protocol provide
99. See THOMAS ANDREW O'KEEFE, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE
AGREEMENTS, ch. 14-4, Transnational Publishers, Irvington, New York (1997).
100. MERCOSUR, supra note 7 at Annex II, art. 1.
101. Id. at art. 5.
102. Id. at art. 4.
103. Id. at art. 5.
104. Protocol of Colonia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments
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with certain exceptions that national treatment will be provided
for foreign investment from other MERCOSUR members. They
also allow for the restriction or prohibition of investment in
certain sectors.1" Article 4 provides assurances against
nationalization or expropriation. Article 5 guarantees the right
to repatriate capital. Article 9 guarantees the investor a right to
binding, international arbitration after six months of
nonresolution of a dispute. The arbitration does not require the
exhaustion of local remedies and is mandatory for the host
country. Non-member country investment is controlled by the
Protocol on Foreign Investment."°6 It operates in substantially
the same manner as the Protocol of Colonia.
The organizational structure of the post-transitional period
is governed by the Protocol of Ouro Preto.10 7 As noted above, it
established MERCOSUR as a legal entity under international
law with six institutional organs at its core. Article 1 of the
protocol calls for a Council of the Common Market (CCM), a
Common Market Group (CMG), a MERCOSUR Trade
Commission (MTC), a Joint Parliamentary Commission (JPC), a
Economic-Social Consultative Forum (ESCF), and MERCOSUR
Administrative Secretariat (MAS). Article 1 also allows for the
creation of any auxiliary organs as may be necessary to assist in
the integration process.
The CCM, originally created under the Treaty of Asuncion, is
the highest organ in MERCOSUR.' 8 It mainly functions to
formulate policy and promote measures that assist in building
the common market, but it is also responsible for negotiating
agreements on behalf of MERCOSUR and ruling on proposals
presented to it by the CMG."°s The CMG, also established under
the Treaty of Asuncion, mainly functions to submit draft
Decisions to the CCM, to implement any measures necessary to
Within MERCOSUR, January 17, 1994. [hereinafter Protocol of Colonial.
105. See O'Keefe, supra note 99, at ch. 14-9 (for example, under this provision Brazil,
Uruguay, and Paraguay have reserved the right to limit foreign investment in their
telecommunications sectors).
106. See Protocol on the Promotion and Protection of Investments Originated in Non-
MERCOSUR Countries, August 5, 1994, [hereinafter Foreign Investment Protocol]. See
also Horacio A. Grigera Naon, Free Trade Areas: The Challenge and Promise of Fair us.
Free Trade; Panel V. Regionalism and the Transfer of Sovereignty; Sovereignty and
Regionalism, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1073, 1104 (1996).
107. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 41.
108. MERCOSUR, supra note 7.
109. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 41, at art. 8.
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enforce CCM Decision, and to carry out any duties delegated to it
by the CCM."' The MTC primarily functions to monitor and
report on the development of a common trade policy, propose to
the CMG any new regulations or changes to regulations relating
to trade or customs policy, and propose revisions to tariff rates on
specific items."1  The JPC exists to help speed the integration
process by "ensur[ing] the prompt entry into force of the decisions
taken by the MERCOSUR organs.", 2  ESCF serves as a
consultative forum for the nongovernmental entities in the
economic and social sectors."' The MAS is the operational
support body that is responsible for publication and archiving the
regulations and decisions of the other organs, as well as,
handling organizational matters for the other organs through its
base of operations in Montevideo, Uruguay."'
As noted previously, the Protocol of Brasilia governs any
dispute resolution in MERCOSUR. In contrast to the approach
taken by NAFTA which allows individuals to bring claims, all
dispute matters in MERCOSUR must be handled on a
governmental level. 15 The claims procedure begins with direct
government-to-government negotiations; if they fail, the
executive body of MERCOSUR makes a recommendation; if no
agreement is forthcoming, the process ends with a binding
decision from an ad hoc arbitration tribunal."6 Although it did
not create a supranational court some have argued that under
the Vienna Convention on Treaties, to which all MERCOSUR
members are party, the MERCOSUR rules are superior to the
national rules of its members."7
Anti-dumping and countervailing duties were not addressed
in any of the main protocols or the Treaty of Asuncion. Instead,
it was agreed between parties that they would apply their own
national legislation and coordinate their policies through an
exchange of information until a MERCOSUR wide policy could be
110. Id. at art. 15.
111. Id. at art. 19.
112. Id. at art. 25.
113. Id. at art. 29.
114. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 41, at art. 32.
115. MERCOSUR, supra note 7 at Annex III, par.1. (MERCOSUR and the Treaty of
Brasilia both only contemplate resolution of disputes between "State Parties.")
116. See De Aguinis, supra note 95, at 606; See also Arocena, supra note 93, at 12.
117. See De Aguinis, supra note 95, at 613.
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implemented.118  CMC Decision 18/96 from December 1996
establishes a Protocol for the Defense of Competition that shifts
the competition policy away from national legislation and to its
procedural control after December 31, 2000 for intra-
MERCOSUR disputes.'19 Currently there are no procedures for
investigating third country trade practices affecting
MERCOSUR, but they are expected by the time that the Protocol
for the Defense of Competition becomes controlling.'
A trade in services protocol is contemplated within the
framework of the MERCOSUR agreement; however, it is still in
the process of negotiation. It is expected to be similar to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that was
recently negotiated within the framework of the World Trade
Organization. 2' There has been some agreement on issues such
as mutual recognition of high school and technical degrees.'
However, Brazil, unlike Argentina, has been reluctant to enter
into a commitment in GATS, so any progress in this area will be
slow.12'
Finally, as is illustrated by the preceding paragraph relating
to a trade in services protocol, and unlike the NAFTA discussed
in the previous section, many areas of harmonization are still in
a state of development and have little or no supranational
regulation to promote a single market policy. Some of these
areas include standards related measures, government
procurement, telecommunications, financial services, and
protection of intellectual property.
C. Impact of the Agreement on Member Trade
The creation of MERCOSUR is the most significant and
ambitious attempt by a group of developing countries to form a
trading bloc to date. In 1997, its population reached over 207
million people and it had a gross domestic product of $758 billion
118. See O'Keefe, supra note 99, at ch. 14-13,14; See also Arocena, supra note 93, at
12-13.
119. See O'Keefe, supra note 99, at ch. 14-14.
120. See id.
121. See Shirley Coffield, Lecture on MERCOSUR structure, NAFTA and other
regional trade agreements, Georgetown University, (April 1, 1998).
122. See O'Keefe, supra note 99, at ch. 14-18.
123. See Ocampo, supra note 94, at 382.
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dollars."4 Intra-MERCOSUR trade accounted for almost 25
percent of all member trade and over half of its total exports
were destined for countries in the Western Hemisphere.'" If one
were to include Chile and Bolivia, the MERCOSUR free trade
area accounts for almost 30 percent of member trade.' Despite
the many detractors and critics who argued that MERCOSUR
would fail to be implemented as many free trade agreements
between developing countries have, in October 1996 the World
Trade Organization reported that "intra-regional trade between
[the] MERCOSUR partners has been duty free since 1 January
1995 except for 29 tariff line items" out of 9,107, which amounts
to 95 percent of all intra-MERCOSUR trade being at the zero
tariff level."7
1. Economic Effects
Until the recent shift toward trade liberalization, most
countries in Latin America focused their development on the
policy of import substitution.2 ' With this policy, the countries
maintained very high tariff rates to encourage development of
domestic industry at the expense of imports.29  This was
implemented in spite of any inefficiencies or increased expense of
the product that resulted from domestic production. As a result of
these high tariffs there was very minimal intra-regional trade
between Latin American countries even for products from
particular countries which had a comparative advantage.
Furthermore, what export trade Latin American countries did
engage in was directed outside Latin America, primarily toward
the United States and Europe.' MERCOSUR is attempting to
change that by generating greater regional trade.'
From 1990 to 1994, intra-MERCOSUR imports by Argentina
124. See Integration and Trade in the Americas, supra note 43, at 4.
125. See id. at 2 (If one were to include Chile and Bolivia, intra-MERCOSUR trade
increases another five percent). Id.
126. See id.
127. See Alexander Yeats, World Bank Working Paper, Does MERCOSUR's Trade
Performance Raise Concerns about the Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements?, February
1997, p. 24.
128. See Arocena, supra note 93, at 6.
129. See Iglesias, supra note 46, at 5.
130. See Arocena, supra note 93, at 39-40.
131. See Arocena, supra note 93, at 39-40.
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increased almost six fold with its imports from outside
MERCOSUR also increasing more than five fold, Brazilian
imports from MERCOSUR members climbed 100 percent and by
38 percent from non-MERCOSUR members, intra-MERCOSUR
imports by Paraguay rose by 85 percent with no change in its
imports from extra-MERCOSUR countries, and Uruguayan
imports from MERCOSUR and non-MERCOSUR countries were
up by two and one half times and 74 percent respectively."2
Between 1990 and 1994 Argentina's exports to MERCOSUR
members increased two and a half times with only a 4.5 percent
increase in exports to the rest of the world during the same time
frame, Brazil's intra-MERCOSUR exports increased 4.5 tines
while extra-MERCOSUR exports only increased 25 percent,
Uruguay showed a 52 percent increase in intra-MERCOSUR
exports as opposed to an 8 percent increase for extra-
MERCOSUR exports, and Paraguyan exports to all countries
declined.'3
The above numbers indicate that the intra-regional trade is
increasing at a much greater rate for most MERCOSUR
members than non-member trade, the fact remains that imports
and exports have increased across the board. This trend of
increased trade indicates that all of the trading partners of
MERCOSUR members should be benefiting from trade creation
whether they are part of MERCOSUR or not.'34
2. Trade Distortion
As noted in the NAFTA section, many argue that although
there are benefits to regional trade arrangements, such as
MERCOSUR, because they increase intra-regional trade, they
also tend to discriminate against nonmembers potentially
resulting in trade diversion."' It is also generally held that this
diversion is only present where there are high tariffs governing
non-member trade and many point to MERCOSUR to support
that reasoning. While it is true that the MERCOSUR external
tariff rates have been reduced, they are still considered high. In
132. See id at 39-40.
133. See id.
134. See Iglesias, supra note 46, at 11.
135. See Bernal, supra note 69, at 949.
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fact, MERCOSUR tariffs for non-members are above average for
industrial countries at approximately 3.9 percent. 36
While a 1996 Inter-American Development Bank analysis of
MERCOSUR trade showed that there was distortion in only one
sector as a whole, petroleum, and about fifteen percent of the
overall product categories."' Analysis of trade statistics shows
that the MERCOSUR agreement has created a major
reorientation toward intra-member trade which has not occurred
in agreements like NAFTA.'38 On average about 63 percent of
intra-MERCOSUR trade is manufactured products, about 15
percent above the extra-MERCOSUR export level.'39 The intra-
MERCOSUR trade of food and animal feeds is approximately 11
percent lower than the trade of those products to nonmember
markets with transport and machinery goods becoming
increasingly important.' ° Finally, over 81 percent of Brazil's
intra-MERCOSUR exports are manufactured goods.' Based on
these figures one must ask whether this shift in trade orientation
is genuinely justified based on comparative advantage rather
than other distorting factors.
As was previously discussed, there has been a shift in labor
intensive production, under NAFTA, to Mexico, where the low
cost labor makes the labor intensive products cost effective, while
capital intensive products have remained in the United States
and Canada. However, with MERCOSUR members, there seems
to be a shift away from imports of capital intensive products from
extra-MERCOSUR suppliers and toward intra-MERCOSUR
suppliers. From 1989 to 1994 intra-MERCOSUR vehicle exports
increased from $207 million to $2.1 billion, an increase of over
900 percent, domestic electrical appliances exports increased
from $12.5 million to $97.3 million, a 675 percent increase,
special industrial machinery exports increased from $10.7 million
to $120 million, an increase of over 1000 percent.'42 A World
Bank report tracking these and 27 other separate product
categories showed that most of the products in which intra-
136. See Yeats, supra note 126, at 2.
137. See Iglesias, supra note 46, at 11, quoting IDB period note December 1996,
Annex 1.
138. See Yeats, supra note 126, at 8.
139. See id. at 5.
140. See id. at 7.
141. See id. at 5.
142. See id. at 13.
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MERCOSUR trade was increasing were being traded at a
significantly and disproportionately higher level within
MERCOSUR than they were in non-member markets. 3
Additionally, these same products required a higher than
average capital intensity, in opposition to the comparative
advantage that MERCOSUR countries have in labor intensive
production.'
An analysis of regional comparative advantage showed that
MERCOSUR is becoming less competitive internationally in
products that were the biggest part of the reorientation toward
intra-member trade."' In point of fact, the top five products with
the greatest shift toward intra-MERCOSUR trade, non-alcoholic
beverages, lead, prepared dairy, non-wheat meal or flour, and
perfumes/cosmetics, are among the least competitive
internationally. "6  Three other product categories, transport
equipment, non-electrical machinery, and electrical machinery,
which accounted for over fifty percent of the increase in intra-
MERCOSUR trade between 1988 and 1994 were also among the
least competitive products made in MERCOSUR."7  This
indicates that the products with the biggest gains in intra-
MERCOSUR trade are ones that cannot be exported to non-
member countries because they are so uncompetitive and need
the protective tariffs to thrive.
Not surprisingly, the same products which enjoyed the
greatest shift toward intra-MERCOSUR trade also enjoyed the
highest tariff levels on foreign imports. 4 1 On average, they were
protected by a duty of approximately 18 percent, seven percent
higher than the average duty on the other goods analyzed in the
report.1 49  In addition to the high tariff levels there is the
application of non-tariff barriers to about 21 percent of all tariff
line items.5' A more extreme example of this protection is
automobile production in MERCOSUR countries, one of the most
heavily protected industries in the region, with even trade
143. See id. at 15.
144. See Yeats, supra note 126, at 15.
145. See id. at 18.
146. See id. at 17.
147. See id. at 18-20.
148. See id. at 23.
149. See Yeats, supra note 126, at 26.
150. See id. at 28.
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between members subject to quotas. 5 ' In April 1995, Brazil
raised its tariff on automobiles from non-MERCOSUR countries
from 20 percent to 70 percent."' Shortly afterward, in June 1995,
Brazil also reduced its tariff on capital goods, components, and
raw materials to the sector from 18 percent to 2 percent.5 3 These
two actions created a preference for member manufactured cars
and forced any other automobile manufacturers to manufacture
their products in MERCOSUR countries or be shut out of a
significant portion of the automobile market.
There appears to be a trend with MERCOSUR producers
reorienting their products for intra-MERCOSUR trade based on
the protection of higher tariffs and other trade barriers allowing
them to continue being uncompetitive. This may be creating a
situation where MERCOSUR consumers are paying higher prices
for lower quality products. If not for the barriers, consumers
would be paying less for better quality goods which were
purchased from extra-MERCOSUR sources.
IV. THE FTAA
A. Overview
The proposed FTAA comprised 776 million potential
consumers from countries that had a combined GDP of $8.5
trillion in 1997.15 In 1996, total trade to the potential members
of the FTAA totaled over $2.4 trillion or 22 percent of world
trade. 5' If current trends continue the Western Hemisphere will
be the world's largest market with more than 850 million
consumers buying $13 trillion in goods and services within only a
151. See Arocena, supra note 93, at 17 (Despite the quota system there has been free
trade in vehicles and parts between Brazil and Argentina since 1986). Id. at 31. (Although
it currently is regulated by bilateral agreements the members of MERCOSUR have
agreed that automobiles will be included in the common external tariff scheme and have a
zero tariff on intra-member trade by January 1, 2000).
152. See id. at 17.
153. See id. at 30-31.
154. See Integration and Trade in the Americas, supra note 43, at 4.
(As noted earlier, the scope of the current negotiations includes every country in the
Western Hemisphere except Cuba).
155. See Raymond J. Ahearn, Congressional Research Service, Hemispheric Trade:
Status, Hurdles, and Opposition, Nov. 25, 1997, p. 1.
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few years.'6
B. Negotiations and Proposed Structure
As noted previously, the formal negotiations to establish the
FTAA began in April 1998. The countries involved in the
negotiations have agreed that the FTAA will be a hemisphere-
wide, separate agreement negotiated by the parties that will
coexist with all current regional agreements."7 Furthermore, it
will be consistent with all WTO obligations, and liberalization
should be completed within ten years of signing.'58
A tripartite committee, composed of the OAS, Inter-
American Development Bank, and U.N. Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean, will oversee the entire
process, including the other three areas of negotiation aside from
the FTAA.'59 The basic structure of the negotiations is centered
around the following principles:
* consensus constitutes the fundamental principle of
decision-making in the FTAA process;
* any eventual undertaking on a free trade area must take
the form of a comprehensive single undertaking;
* the FTAA can co-exist with bilateral and subregional
agreements to the extent that the rights and obligations under
these agreements are not covered by or go beyond the rights and
obligations of the FTAA;
* the FTAA must be fully consistent with WTO agreements,
in particular with Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and its
Uruguay Round understanding and Article V of the GATT;
* special attention should be given to the needs, economic
conditions and opportunities of the smaller economies to ensure
their full participation in the process;
* a temporary administrative Secretariat should be
established to support the negotiations;60 and
156. See Ahearn, supra note 11, at 3.
157. See Ahearn, supra note 161, at 3.
158. See id. at 3-4.
159. See James Holbein, Lecture on NAFTA and other regional trade agreements,
Georgetown University, (April 22, 1998).
160. See id. (In spite of this goal, no site was agreed on at April 1998 meeting in
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* 2005 is the target date for concluding negotiations, at the
latest.'
Although it is only one member of the tripartite committee
overseeing the entire negotiation, the Organization of American
States plays such a very important role of the FTAA process that
any discussion of the process must include it. The FTAA function
in the process includes the Special Committee on Trade (SCT),
Special Committee of the Permanent Council on Inter-American
Summits Management (SCIASM), the Inter-American Juridical
Committee (IAJC), the Trade Unit, and the Secretariat for Legal
Affairs. 1
6 2
The objective of the SCT is to promote trade liberalization
and expansion among countries in the hemisphere. It achieves
this goal by coordinating with the various regional and
subregional trade organizations and non-governmental
organizations in the hemisphere, studying and analyzing existing
integration agreements, and preparing a compilation of data on
the region.' The objective of the SCIASM is to coordinate all the
activities of the OAS dealing with the four categories that
comprise the process which includes the FTAA. The IAJC is an
advisory body on legal matters relating to the integration and
international trade issues including possible methods of dispute
settlement under the FTAA."' The Trade Unit is part of the
General Secretariat and functions as a source of technical
support for the SCT by providing it with information on inter-
country integration within the hemisphere and strengthening
trade information systems.6 The SLA is tasked with promoting
legal and judicial cooperation between the countries involved in
the process and providing advisory services for other parts of the
OAS to assist in the drafting of uniform national laws.'66
Twelve working groups are involved in the negotiations:
Santiago. Therefore, no permanent site for the FTAA secretariat has been decided as of
the writing of this paper. For the near term, it is scheduled to revolve between three
cities: Miami until 2001, Panama City from 2001 until 2003, and Mexico City from 2003-
2004.)
161. See Integration and Trade in the Americas, supra note 43, at 18.
162. See Jeanette M.E. Tramhel, Free Trade in the Americas: A Perspective from the
Organization of American States, 19 HOus. J. INT'L L. 595, 597-603 (1997).
163. See id. at 598-99.
164. See id. at 600-03.
165. See id. at 602.
166. See id. at 602-03.
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market access, customs procedures and rules of origin,
investment, standards and technical barriers to trade, sanitary
and phytosanitary measures, subsidies, anti-dumping and
countervailing duties, small economies, intellectual property,
services, competition policy, and dispute resolution."7 Although
there is no real structure to the FTAA at this writing, the
separate negotiating groups are indicative of what will likely be
the major components of the final agreement. These are
substantially the same categories that were used during the
NAFTA negotiations and are more than likely the core of the
agreement that will be signed at the end of the negotiations,
early in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, many of these
working groups, whose subject matter is discussed in the
previous sections on NAFTA and MERCOSUR, will be sources of
conflict simply because of the interplay between the United
States attempting to achieve language close to that of NAFTA
and Brazil seeking language that closely tracks that of
MERCOSUR.
The largest areas of potential conflict between the two trade
blocs are 1) rule of origin requirements, 2) anti-dumping and
countervailing duties 3) telecommunications, 4) financial
services, and 5) intellectual property."8 The reason for the
conflict is the substantial difference that exists between
MERCOSUR and NAFTA in these areas. For example, the
NAFTA rules of origin are much more complex and have a higher
local content requirement then either MERCOSUR or the recent
Chile-Canada Free Trade Agreement.' In the area of anti-
dumping and countervailing duties, there is serious resentment
not only to the United States application of the duties, but to
their use in general. In point of fact, the Chile-Canada Free
Trade agreement has an anti-dumping phase-out and
MERCOSUR prohibits their use internally after 1999.'
Financial services are also an area of concern because the United
States enjoys a substantial comparative advantage, and it has
been traditionally considered closed to non-nationals in many
developing countries, including Brazil and Uruguay.'7'
167. See Integration and Trade in the Americas, supra note 43, at 17-18.
168. See O'Keefe, supra note 4, at 307.
169. See id. at 306. (The Chile-Canada Agreement only requires 35 percent local
content).
170. See id.; See also O'Keefe, supra note 99, at ch. 14-13,14.
171. See O'Keefe, supra note 99, at ch. 14-9,10.
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Telecommunications is also another area that usually has
restrictions on foreign investment in developing countries,
including Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay, and one in which the
United States and Canada also enjoy a substantial comparative
advantage. Finally, intellectual property protection has long
been a source of contention because many Latin American
countries consider it to be an obstacle to development and any
United States attempt to adopt NAFTA-type protections will not
be received well.
7 3
One of the problems with the approach that is being taken
with the FTAA negotiations is that the agreement will overlay
the 23 trade pacts or agreements in the region. This is further
complicating the current overlap of many regional and
subregional agreements with yet another layer of rules and
regulations governing trade transactions, creating more
confusion.
Any hemispheric trade agreement is going to revolve around
the two biggest trade entities in the Western Hemisphere,
NAFTA and MERCOSUR. Together the two blocs constituted
over 92 percent of all exports in the hemisphere in 1997.174
Although the NAFTA partners are not negotiating as one, like
MERCOSUR, they are as much of a force to be reckoned with as
is MERCOSUR. As a result, any accord will be difficult to
achieve in the areas that there is divergence of objectives and
incompatibility between the two agreements.
C. Impact of the Proposed Agreement on the
Hemisphere
The population of countries in the proposed FTAA was 776.3
million in 1997 with a gross domestic product of $8.54 trillion.
7 5
If one were to exclude NAFTA from the hemispheric calculations,
it would mean United States access to a market of 380.4 million
people with a combined GDP of $1.1 trillion growing at
approximately 5 to 6 percent a year.'76 Analyzing the numbers
from the Latin American perspective, it gives those countries
172. See id. at ch. 14-9.
173. See id. at ch. 14-11.
174. See Integration and Trade in the Americas, supra note 43, at 2.
175. See id. at 4.
176. See id. at 4-5.
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duty free access to the 395.9 million person NAFTA market with
a GDP of $7.45 trillion.177 The economies of Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, and Mexico comprise nearly 85 percent of the current
economic output of Latin America. 178  At the other end of the
prosperity spectrum, there are small economies which depend
almost exclusively on a single commodity or product.
179
Despite their size and share of the Latin American economy
as a whole, the trade impact of the FTAA on MERCOSUR
countries, at least initially, would be muted because a
substantial portion of MERCOSUR trade will be within the
customs union and already duty free or will be with Europe
which is outside the FTAA. 80 A study by the Centro de Economia
Internacional - Buenos Aires showed that Argentina would only
gain approximately $100 million annually in increased trade,
against a U.S. increase of $1.5 billion. 8' In 1997, only 16.3
percent of all MERCOSUR exports were directed toward NAFTA,
of that a substantial portion was to Mexico.182 Furthermore, the
growth rate of MERCOSUR exports to NAFTA was substantially
slower than the increase of exports to the rest of the
hemisphere.' In this context it is notable that in 1994, for the
first time, Brazil, with Latin America's largest industrial base,
surpassed the United States in exports to Latin America." In
this context it is understandable that Brazil is reluctant to
subject its substantial manufactured goods export base to
unrestricted competition from U.S. sources.
One of the main concerns from MERCOSUR regarding the
FTAA is that trade from cheaper sources outside of the Western
Hemisphere will be diverted to the United States because of the
purchasing power available and the lack of tariffs to protect their
industry, thereby creating a dependence on the United States for
177. See id. at 4.
178. See Mark, B. Baker, Integration of the Americas: A Latin Renaissance or a
Prescription for Disaster?, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 309, 318 (1997); See also De
Aguinis, supra note 95, at 601.
179. Baker, supra note 183, at 318.
180. See Yeats, supra note 126, at 4 (Table 1).
181. See De Aguinis, supra note 95, at 629.
182. See Integration and Trade in the Americas, supra note 43, at 2.
183. See id. (NAFTA exports only increased at 3.6 percent whereas exports to Latin
America increased 18.4 percent.) Id.
184. See Baker supra note 183, at 328 (Eighty percent of Brazil's exports to Latin
America were in the form of manufactured goods).
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capital goods and inputs."8 5 At the same time, MERCOSUR
argues that it would have little to gain for the increased costs of
the diversion because of the low level of trade with the United
States.'86 However, despite the concerns from MERCOSUR, it
cannot be denied that the FTAA will secure access to one of the
world's biggest markets and lock in an advantage in Latin
America. While traditionally most U.S. hemispheric imports
have been from Central America and northern South America,
recently there has been a significant increase in trade with other
countries in the hemisphere.. Between 1990 and 1996, exports to
Brazil increased 149 percent, exports to Argentina grew 275
percent, and exports to Chile climbed 141 percent.1 8 7 At the same
time U.S. imports increased 11 percent from Brazil, 53 percent
from Argentina, and 77 percent from Chile.'88 In 1997, 74 percent
of Latin America's exports went to NAFTA.'89
In considering the U.S. view of the benefits of the FTAA, an
Institute for International Economics study shows that
hemispheric integration would increase U.S. exports to Latin
America by about $36 billion and U.S. imports by $28 billion
above the levels that might be reached without further
integration for the period between 1997 and 2002.190
Hemispheric wide free trade would boost the economies of the
region by 1.5 percent a year.'91 If the agreement were currently
in place, the regional output would be increased to almost $300
billion a year by 2002 and foreign investment would rise by
almost $10 billion a year. 192 Although Latin America is currently
only 7 percent of U.S. trade, it holds the promise of faster, long-
term growth and potential to be an important export market. It
also would support long-term merchandise trade markets, open
new trade in service markets and investment markets, and
support continued stability in the hemisphere. Between 1990
and 1996 U.S. exports to Latin America, excluding Mexico,
185. See O'Keefe, supra note 99, at ch. 14-17 (Currently, most of MERCOSUR
sourcing is done with Europe).
186. See id. at ch. 14-17,18.
187. See J.F. Hornbeck, Congressional Research Service, A Free Trade Area of the
Americas: Toward Integrating Regional Trade Policies, Sept. 25, 1997, p. 7.
188. See id.
189. See Integration and Trade in the Americas, supra note 43, at 2.
190. See Ahearn, supra note 11, at 3.
191. See id. at 5.
192. See id.
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increased by 103 percent.'9 3 While during that same time period,
U.S. imports from Latin America, excluding Mexico, increased
only 44 percent.19 4
Since 1989, U.S. exports to Latin America have increased at
more than double the rate of exports to other parts of the world.'
Most of these exports are high value, with imports concentrating
on raw materials and complementary products.9 If trends
continue, by the turn of the century U.S. exports to Latin
America will exceed combined exports to Europe and Japan.'97
Importantly, these increased exports are in technology enhanced
industrial exports such as automobiles, computers,
telecommunications equipment, and electrical and power
generation equipment. " All of these products are produced
efficiently by the United States and are subject to serious
competition from Japan and East Asia in third markets outside
of the Western Hemisphere.9 In contrast U.S. imports from
Latin America are mostly semi-manufactured goods, natural
resource based products, and petroleum products."°°
Finally, even if you were to exclude the NAFTA-MERCOSUR
competition dynamic, the creation of an FTAA would benefit
Latin America significantly because of the recent growth in intra-
regional trade. In 1996, 54 percent of all Western Hemisphere
exports were to destinations in the hemisphere.2"' Intra-
hemisphere exports grew faster than extra-hemisphere exports
by almost three percent.0 2 In 1996, 74 percent of MERCOSUR
exports and 55 percent of all NAFTA exports were for the
Western Hemisphere."3  Additionally, 35.1 percent of all
MERCOSUR exports to the hemisphere were to Latin America,
and while only 24 percent of NAFTA intra-hemispheric exports
went to Latin America, 24 NAFTA exports to MERCOSUR alone
193. See Hornbeck, supra note 191, at 6.
194. See id.
195. See Ocampo, supra note 94, at 377.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See Hornbeck, supra note 191, at 6.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See Integration and Trade in the Americas, supra note 43, at 2.
202. See id. (Intra-hemisphere exports increased by 12.9 percent as opposed to extra-





grew at 13 percent from 1996 to 1997.2" 5
V. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, it is difficult to determine what results
the FTAA would bring to both Latin America and the United
States as far as trade benefits are concerned.
This paper has shown that even NAFTA, which is not
supposed to create trade distortive effects because of the low U.S.
and Canadian tariffs, does appear to do so and has not achieved
the results that many had argued that it would. While it is
possible that gains expected from free trade with Mexico need to
be evaluated over the long term, I believe that Mexico is
indicative of the results that the United States will see with free
trade to Latin America as a whole. Like U.S.-Mexico trade, it is a
small part of the U.S. trade picture today. It is dwarfed by U.S.
trade to Asia, Europe, and Canada. However, an
acknowledgment must be made of the recent, significant growth
of U.S. trade to the region, albeit from a small base, and the fact
that Latin America is projected to be an economic force in the
near future at its present rate of growth. With this being so, can
the United States sit by and pass up the opportunity to secure
such a market for the future? I believe that the answer in this
case is a definitive no; if the United States does let it pass, it will
not only surrender the market, but possibly leadership in the
region to MERCOSUR.
While it is true that the creation of a hemispheric free trade
area would secure the lucrative market of the United States for
Latin America, what benefit would it be to those countries with
the largest economies in Latin America, Brazil and Argentina,
when they have little to gain because only a small amount of
their trade is with the United States? As was shown in the
analysis above, MERCOSUR has a significant problem with
trade distortion and this could be easily translated into a
hemisphere-wide phenomenon with the creation of the FTAA.
However, despite the risks of this effect, can Latin America, like
the United States, pass on securing an access to a market that
will provide the kind of sustained long-term growth that is
needed to maintain the economic development that the region
205. See id.
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seeks? I believe that the answer is no because as Mexico has
shown with the significant increase in foreign direct investment,
falling trade barriers means increased investment in the
economy.

